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Abstract
Venture Capital investments combine skills and nancial risks. The capacity of
nancial intermediaries to assume nancial risk has to meet managerial skills able
to screen the projects, then to increase the number and the return of the successful
projects among the selected ones. The screening tasks are devoted in seed stage to
the Venture Capitalist in charge of the project (the leader). Improving the num-
ber and the quality of the successful projects is a task which is partly shared by
the members of syndicates associated with the leader during the development stage.
Venture capitalists are heterogeneous; there also exist many ways to fund a project;
nally, there are many forms of syndicates. Looking at this diversity, the question
is to nd a relevant way to match - for each kind of Venture Capitalist and for each
kind of project - the good nancial solutions (which can be interpreted as a nan-
cial incentive) and the appropriate form of syndication. Is there a way to reach the
best combination: this point is analyzed in depth in our paper. We rst present a
review of the literature on the nature and goals of funds providers on the one hand
and the motives of syndication in the other hand. Then we propose an original
model analyzing from the partners (venture capitalists and funds providers) and
from the social points of view, the properties of the relevant available technologies
associating more or less skillful leader, dierent forms of syndicates and of nancial
partners. A rst set of results is devoted to the matching competencies of the leader
and the syndicates within a given nancial environment. A second set of results
considers as endogenous the type of incentives introduced by the nancial partners
and the consequence of their optimization on the form of syndication promoted
by the leaders, according their own skills and the quality of the syndicates. The
inuence of the level of risk and of the shape of the project are then analyzed on
the optimal matching solutions.
JEL Classication: G2, G3
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01 Introduction
Venture capital is typically dened as the investment by professional investors of long-
term equity nance in new rms where the primary reward is a possible capital gain,
supplemented by dividend yield. Venture capital investments are made in companies not
quoted on stock markets, where the investor trades-o the short-term illiquidity in the
shares held for the prospects of a greater future return (Wright and Robbie 1998; Gom-
pers and Lerner 2001).
Venture capital backed companies are characterized by the problems of informational
asymmetry between insiders and outsiders, with a need for relatively close monitoring
(Tykvova 2007). The tools that venture capital rms have to address these informa-
tion issues are to scrutinize rms intensively before providing capital and then to mon-
itor them afterwards. The monitoring and information tools include: stage nancing
(Sahlman 1990); syndicating investments with other capital rms (Gompers and Lerner
2004; Manigart et al. 2006; Lerner 1994); taking seats on a rm's board of directors
(Lerner, 1995); and compensation arrangements including stock options (Sahlman 1990).
Of course, the eciency of these screening and monitoring tools is not homogeneous
in the venture capital industry:
(i) Each venture capitalist is more or less expert to screen and monitor its portfolio
companies: venture capitalist' skills are heterogeneous;
(ii) There also exists many ways to fund a project and the strategies of venture capital
rms are not independent of the specic goals pursued by their funds providers;
(iii) Finally, if the investments are syndicated, there are many forms of syndicates,
each of them being founded on specic motivations and goals.
Looking at this diversity, the question is to nd a relevant way to match - for each
kind of Venture Capitalist and for each kind of project - the good nancial solutions and
the appropriate form of syndication. Is there a way to reach the best combination: this
point is analyzed in depth in our paper. We rst present a review of the literature fo-
cusing on the role of skills, the dierent forms of syndication and nally the relationship
between venture capitalists and their funds providers. An important limit of the works
centered on these topics is to treat these three central features of the venture capitalist's
investment decision independently of each other. Then we propose an original model
analyzing from the partners (venture capitalists and funds providers) and from the social
points of view, the properties of the relevant available technologies associating more or
less skillful leader, dierent forms of syndicates and of nancial partners. A rst set of
results is devoted to the matching competencies of the leader and the syndicates within a
given nancial environment. A second set of results considers as endogenous the type of
incentives introduced by the nancial partners and the consequence of their optimization
on the form of syndication promoted by the leaders, according to their own skills and
the quality of the syndicates 1. The inuence of the level of risk and of the shape of the
1To our knowledge, no other theoretical paper considers these three dimensions simultaneously as we
do. Two papers (Cestone et al, 2006 and Casamatta and Haritchbalet 2007) consider the inuence of
experience in the formation of venture capital syndication but do not analyze the impact on the choice
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0project is then analyzed on the optimal matching solutions.
2 Skills, syndication and funds providers
Venture capitalists' skills heterogeneity, the relationship between venture capitalists and
their funds providers and the syndication of venture capital investments have been ana-
lyzed in depth in a great number of theoretical and empirical works. The main results of
these works are recalled below.
2.1 Heterogeneous skills, screening and monitoring
The eciency of screening and monitoring tools is strongly inuenced by the level of
skill of the venture capitalist. Skills are heterogeneous in the venture capital industry
because each venture capitalist is characterized by a specic degree of experience and
specialization.
As regards experience, learning theory suggests that the amount of a venture capi-
talist's prior investment experience should be related to how much the venture capitalist
learns from its investments. Prior investment experience may help the venture capitalist
to develop a more specialized understanding regarding the information provided by the
portfolio companies. Prior research has shown that once an investment is made, the
venture capitalist often plays an active role on the board of their portfolio companies or
in other less formal ways (Gorman and Sahlman, 1989; Sapienza, 1992). The more the
venture capitalist has developed expertise in dealing with portfolio companies based on
its prior investments, the more ecient it will be in identifying relevant information. Sim-
ilarly, prior investment experience may increase the extent to which the venture capitalist
gains new understandings from its interactions with a portfolio company since the venture
capitalist has a broader knowledge base to draw from, and therefore a more extensive
amount of existing knowledge with which to combine the new information (Cohen and
Levinthal, 1990). For instance, venture capitalist's experience in dealing with portfolio
companies should increase the ability to assess the business plan or monthly reports of
the portfolio companies. In the same vein, Bottazzi et alii (2004a, 2008) show that ven-
ture capital rms with partners that have prior business experience provide more support
and governance. They are more active recruiting managers and directors, helping with
fundraising, and interacting more frequently with their portfolio companies.
Another important source of heterogeneity in skills is the level of specialization of
the venture capitalist. Whereas some venture capitalists may prefer to diversify their
portfolio in order to decrease their nancial risk, others prefer to specialize and focus
on developing specic expertise within a given domain. Gupta and Sapienza (1992),
Manigart (1994), and De Clercq and Dimov (2003) found that venture capitalists who
specialize in a particular stage of investment, e.g. early phase, and/or industry sector,
acquire a better expertise and thereby achieve a competitive advantage deriving from the
of funds providers.
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0accumulation of "hard to imitate" internal resources. According to Gupta and Sapienza
(1992), a limited industry (or development stage) scope of investments facilitates control
over the management of the nanced companies by the venture capitalist rm; i.e. it
may be more dicult for portfolio companies to hide issues of management incompetence
or other crucial information regarding company performance due to the venture capital-
ist rms more in-depth understanding of the industry (or development stage). Another
reason why investments in similar types of portfolio companies may pay o is the in-
creased possibility that subsequent investments lead to learning curve eects through the
application of superior knowledge (e.g. Gupta and Sapienza, 1992; De Clercq, Goulet,
Kumpulainen and M akel a, 2001). For instance, the ability to grasp the management
problems related to a certain stage of development, or to understand the competitive
specics in a particular industry, may increase (e.g. Wright and Robbie, 1998). Simi-
lar ideas are developed by Sahlman (1990) who observes that specialization can reduce
marginal operating costs when venture capitalists learn things and develop skills over
time. By specializing, the venture capitalists can accumulate area-specic experience in
a fast and ecient fashion. They can establish long-term relationships with suppliers,
customers, lawyers, and investment bankers. This network of contacts cultivates a ow
of protable deals for venture capitalist rms. The ultimate eect is that the marginal
cost of selecting and supervising a portfolio company declines over time, and the VC rm
becomes more productive.
2.2 Skills' homogeneity / diversication and the goals of syndi-
cation
In recent years venture capital companies have been striving to syndicate investments
with other venture capitalists (Manigart et al., 2006, Wright and Robbie, 1998). Such
syndicates involve two or more venture capital rms taking an equity stake in an invest-
ment for a joint payo (Wilson, 1968), either in the same investment round or, more
broadly dened, at dierent points in time (Brander, Amit, and Antweiler, 2002). Syn-
dicates are typically formed by a lead investor who contacts other potential investors
and records their commitments to invest. Most works focused on the syndication mo-
tivations: why do venture capitalist rms give up potential return by not investing the
whole amount needed by the portfolio company, but rather seek another venture capital
rm to co-invest and thereby share in the potential gains (or losses)? This question is
compounded by the fact that syndicate arrangements are subject to agency conicts and,
hence, agency costs (Fried and Hisrich, 1995; Wright and Lockett, 2003). What are the
perceived benets that compensate for the costs involved in syndication?
A rst answer is risk diversication. Indeed, if the venture capital rm is too small
relative to the project size, syndicating the deal may well be the only way to invest in
that particular deal without unbalancing the VC portfolio. Moreover, syndication gives
the VC rm the opportunity to invest in a larger number of portfolio companies than it
could do without syndication, thereby increasing diversication and reducing the overall
risk of the fund (Gompers and Lerner, 2004; De Clercq and Dimov, 2003; Hege et al.,
2003). More interestingly, the venture capital market can also be seen as a pool of pro-
ductive resources in which a venture capital organisation can access resources of another
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0venture capitalist through syndication (Manigart et al. 2002, Bygrave, 1987). Venture
capitalists syndicate and structure their syndicates in order to increase the amount of
information, skills, and resources available for the decision making, monitoring, and de-
velopment of individual ventures. This enhances the value of the investment by reducing
the costs of asymmetric information and agency and increasing the size and probability of
positive outcomes. From this perspective, syndicating a deal may be an ecient method
for reaching a number of goals, the nature of these goals being inuenced by the level of
homogeneity/diversication of the skills of the syndicate's members.
A rst potential goal is the improvement of the performance of investment projects.
Indeed, the success of venture capitalists in the process of raising further funds to continue
their operations is dependent on their ability to generate a realized return that compares
favorably with that of their competitors. This implies that venture capital rms can
use syndication to enhance the performance of individual investments by pooling the
resources and contributions of syndicate members. This kind of goal is likely to be aimed
by members of syndicates characterized by homogeneous skills such as highly specialized
venture capitalists with an in-depth understanding of a specic industry. Joint eort
in the selection of investments by venture capitalists specialized in the same particular
industry provides a second opinion (Lerner, 1994; Gompers and Lerner, 2004; Hege et al.,
2003), leads to enhanced screening (Brander et al. 2002; Cumming et al. 2005; Cumming
2006a; Casamatta and Haritchabalet 2007; Cestone et al. 2007; Dimov and Milanov
2010), facilitates the monitoring of the ventures (Lerner 1995; Sorenson and Stuart 2001;
Fritsch and Schilder 2006; Meuleman et al. 2009), and, nally, make syndicates able to
improve the performance of investment projects.
Improving the quality of investment projects (for instance by reducing the number
of failures of these projects) is another potential motivation for syndication. Venture
capitalists aim to increase the value of their investments by contributing to their devel-
opment by drawing on the experience and contacts, i.e., the human and social capital,
of their syndicated partners. Members of the syndicate provide advice on strategic and
operational issues related to the ventures. They also provide access to professionals and
additional resources (Gorman and Sahlman 1989; Macmillan et al. 1989; Sapienza et
al. 1996; Hellmann and Puri 2002, Walske et al. 2007). The eciency of a syndicate in
improving the quality of investment projects will be all the better if skills and expertise
of its members do not overlap, i.e. if the syndicate is constituted by venture capital-
ists with diversied skills (for instance venture capitalists with dierent prior investment
experience or specialized in dierent stage of investment or industry sector).
2.3 Heterogeneous goals of funds' providers
The structure and functioning of the professional venture capital industry follows a typ-
ical pattern. Professional venture capital money managers, i.e. venture capitalist rms,
form a venture capital limited partnership fund in which they are the General Partners
and through which money is raised from Limited Partners, i.e. funds providers. The
General Partner receives a management fee and a percentage of the prots. The Limited
Partners receive income, capital gains, and tax benets. The General Partner manages
the partnership using policy laid down in a Partnership Agreement. The agreement also
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0covers terms, fees, structures, and other items agreed on between the Limited Partners
and the General Partner. Investors in venture capital funds comprise both wealthy indi-
viduals and institutions with large amounts of available capital, such as state and private
pension funds, university nancial endowments, foundations, pension and insurance com-
panies and pooled investment vehicles such as funds of funds or mutual funds.
In this standard organization of the industry which has emerged in United States ven-
ture capital rms are typically independent organizations (Gompers and Lerner, 2004).
Indeed, a common feature of these rms is that no one investor or shareholder has a
dominant position in the rm's ownership which implies a rather small implication of the
limited partners.
However in recent years, a number of factors have contributed to an increased power
of the funds providers. First, the venture capital industry is increasingly driven by the
requirements of institutional fund providers who are under mounting pressure to achieve
better than average short-term results (Van Osnabrugge and Robinson, 2001). Second,
funds providers are now also being advised by organizations known as \gatekeepers",
who determine which venture capitalists should be supplied (Robbie et al. 1997). Fi-
nally, it can be argued that independent venture capitalists need to demonstrate high
(above-average) returns on their investments to please the exclusively nancial goal of
their fund providers.
There are, however, venture capitalist types which - with respect to their governance
as well as with regard to their objectives - dier from this prototype of an indepen-
dent venture capitalist. We can dierentiate three types of venture capitalists other than
independent venture capitalists: corporate venture capitalists, bank-aliated venture cap-
italists, and public venture capitalists (nanced mainly with public money). Corporate
and bank-aliated venture capitalists are referred to as captive venture capitalists. A
captive venture capital rm is a company that belongs to an established corporation that
is investing its own resources. The parent organization is often a nancial institution,
such as a bank (for bank-aliated venture capitalists), but can sometimes also be a larger
non-nancial company (for corporate venture capitalists). These venture capitalist funds
tend to be open-ended and the amount they are allocated for investment purposes reects
the overall strategy of the parent institution.
Literature is less documented on the behavior of bank-aliated venture capitalists 2
which is however a relevant business model in European countries. Providing empirical
evidence on dierent periods and countries 3, Tykvova (2006), Mayer, Schoors and Yafeh
(2005), Bottazzi et al (2004a), Hellmann, Lindsey and Puri (2004), or Van Osnabrugge
and Robinson (2001) have however pointed out recently that bank-aliated venture cap-
italist rms behave dierently than their independent counterparts for two main reasons.
First, bank-aliated venture capitalist rms have `unlimited' access to nance (Woolf-
man, 1993) and, thus, may have a greater tolerance for lower returns, providing that other
2For an analysis of corporate VCs, see for instance Gompers and Lerner (2000) and Hellmann (2002).
3In Europe banks are the third largest fundraising source (14%) of the total European funds raised
behind pension funds (27%) and funds of funds (18%) (Source: EVCA Yearbook 2007).
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0goals are being met (Robbie et al. 1997). Second, contrarily to independent VCs, the
main goal of the fund providers, ie banks, is not essentially nancial but strategic. Indeed,
for bank-aliated venture capitalists, venture capital investment activity can be seen as
an extension of the services provided to a potentially protable market segment and as
a mechanism for binding clients into the nancial investor (Bruno, 1986). For example,
Hellmann (2002) builds a model that suggests strategic venture investors like commercial
and investment banks target rms that bring complementarities to their core activities of
lending and underwriting. Hellman, Lindsey and Puri (2004) empirically investigate this
claim, nding that banking organizations use their venture capital subsidiary to build re-
lationships which are in the long run benecial for their lending activities. More precisely,
they nd a strong relationship between banks making venture investments and companies
subsequently raising loans. Furthermore, they show that having a prior venture capital
relationship signicantly increases a bank's chance of participating in a company's loan
deal.
Finally, banks "strategically" engage in VC nancing with the aim to build relation-
ships for their core lending activities. This result is important: it implies that potential
prots resulting from complementarities to core nancial segments may reduce the in-
centive for banks to actively govern their venture capital clients (Hellmann, Lindsey and
Puri, 2004). Given that banks have a strategic focus, they have little incentive to expand
costly resources on building value added support capabilities. If, as underlined above,
banks use venture capital mainly to build lending relationships, building the infrastruc-
ture for providing value-adding support may not be their main priority. In other words,
it may not be necessary to fully imitate the independent venture capitalist for banks to
achieve complementarities between their venture capital and lending activities. This \re-
lationship hypothesis" may explain why bank-aliated VCs, tend to be less intensively
involved in the management and monitoring of their portfolio companies than indepen-
dent VC rms (Bottazzi et al 2004b; Tykvova 2006; Hellmann, Lindsey and Puri, 2004).
To sum up, the investment decision in venture capital is inuenced by three central
features:
- The level of skills of the lead venture capitalist ;
- The level of homogeneity/diversity in the skills of the syndicate's members;
- The nature (bank or hedge fund) of the nancial partner.
In practice, these three dimensions of the investment decision are interrelated: some ven-
ture capitalists, because they exhibit specic experience or specialization, will prefer to
co invest with other venture capitalists exhibiting similar or, on the contrary, dierent
skills and, in the same way, they will prefer to be nanced by a kind of fund provider in
preference to another one.
Curiously, the literature on venture capital treats these features independently of
each other. On the contrary, the model developed below considers the three dimensions
simultaneously: it analyzes from the partners (venture capitalists and funds providers)
and from the social points of view, the properties of the relevant available technologies
associating more or less skillful leader, dierent forms of syndicates and of nancial
partners.
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03 The model
The model analyses the optimal partnerships of a venture-capitalist potentially in charge
of a risky project. This venture-capitalist - that we label the leader - can manage the
project within a two stages setting. During the early stage or seed stage (time 1), the
leader is alone to determine if - according to his views - the project is a good or a bad
project. If it is considered as bad, the project is liquidated at the end of the seed stage. If
not, it is qualied for the development phase (time 2). This development phase associates
the participation of a nancial partner and - optionally - a syndicate of which the leader
can choose the composition and characteristics.
3.1 Projects, Risks and Stages
The risk of the projects is not initially perfectly observable by the leader but uncertainty
can be reduced after the leader and - optionally syndicates - have devoted time and eort
during the seed and the development period.
3.1.1 Asymmetric information and heterogeneity of the projects
Asymmetric information is associated with the technological and organizational com-
ponents of each project. These components are not perfectly observable initially by the
leader. Only the average level of risk and return is observable and associated to each
class of projects. A project of class j is characterized by the following uncertainty: the
project has the probability  to be a high risk / high return project and (1 ) to be low
risk / low return project. If it is a high risk project, it has the probability pj to provide
a gross return Rj with Rj = Rj(pj) and a probability (1   pj) to fail. If it is a low risk
project, it has the probability q to provide a return R and a probability (1   q) to fail
4. In order to make non trivial the selection of the projects, we suppose that Rj(pj) is a
continuous and decreasing function of pj such that E(Rj(pj)) = pjRj(pj) decreases when
pj increases.
3.1.2 The seed stage
Leaders are dened by their level of expertise or experience. This level is inversely
related with the size of the positive parameter . Each project requires a rst capital
contribution S in seed at time 1. This contribution is provided by the leader from its
own reserves. In the seed stage, a leader of class  can also apply a costly screening eort
in order to disclose the failing projects. This level of eort e is dened in the compact
[0;1]. When a level of eort e is applied, the probability to disclose a project likely to
fail is also e, independently of the level of risk of the project. The cost of e is dened by
the continuous and two time derivable function ic(e) with e 6= 0 ) c0(e) > 0, c00(e) > 0,
c(0) = 0, c0(0) = 0 and limt!1 c(e) = +1. When a given project is revealed as a bad
project by application of the screening eort of a leader of class , it is liquidated at
the end of the seed period. The proportion of early liquidated high risk projects is then
(1   p)e and the proportion of early liquidated low risk projects is (1   )(1   q)e.
4Low risk projects are then supposed homogeneous, without any qualitative consequence one the
results of the analysis
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03.1.3 The development stage
At the end of the seed period, when the project is not liquidated, the leader must
associate a nancial partner able to fund the nancial expenses involved at this stage,
that we suppose amounting to D. The leader can also associate a syndicate whose
components are other venture capitalists, simultaneously involved as leaders or partners
in other seed or development projects.
3.2 Financial partners
The nancial partner can be a bank or a hedge-fund.
3.2.1 Banks
If the leader decides to conclude a partnership with a bank, the bank lends D at the
beginning of the development stage a xed rate r without taking the risk of losses if
the project is nally liquidated. Banks are not mainly motivated by the interest r but
consider also their partnership as a way to create new links with future clients, able to
use their services if they are nally successful and introduced to the market. They then
attribute to the leaders an incentive premium P when a project is led to its term. P is
known when the leader chooses its nancial partnership.
3.2.2 Hedge Funds
The leader can alternatively decide a partnership with a hedge fund: in this case, the
hedge fund acquires a share  of the capital D necessary for the development of the
project. A corresponding proportion  of the prots and of the losses is then attributed
to the hedge fund at the end of the development stage. The rest of the capital necessary
for the development is provided by the hedge fund as a loan without interest. The risk
of loss associated with this loan remains under the responsibility of the leader.
3.3 Syndicates
The leader can also associate a syndicate whose components are other venture capitalists.
Syndication has two possible objectives: the rst is to reduce the number of failures in
the remaining projects, the other is to increase the performance of the good projects.
Syndication has also a cost for the leader. The xed cost C corresponds to the manag-
ing and transaction costs associated to the organization of meetings and other forms of
interactions among the members of a syndicate. Syndication has also a variable cost (of
search and screening) increasing with the level of diversication of the skills of the mem-
bers of the syndicate in the case of a syndication able to reduce the number of failures
and increasing with the homogeneity of the partners skills in the case of a syndication
able to improve the performance of the projects.
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03.3.1 Syndicates able to reduce the number of failures / to improve the
quality of the bad projects
This style of syndication (s1) is dened by a level of diversication d of skills in the
syndicate with d 2 [0;1]. All increase of diversication of skills inside this style of
syndicate increases its eciency. Given that the skills of the venture capitalists tend
to have in average no correlation (they are independently distributed on the space of
competences), increasing diversication is costly. We suppose this cost 0cs1(d) such that
d 6= 0 ) c0
s1(d) > 0, c00
s1(d) > 0, cs1(0) = 0, c0
s1(0) = 0 and limt!1 cs1(d) = +1. Smaller is
0, greater is the eciency of the syndicates. The improvement of quality of the projects
associated with the diversication d of the syndicates is the following: as d increases, an
increasing proportion of the (low risk) projects move from the sub-category of non viable
projects to the sub-category of the viable low risk projects. We then suppose that the
proportion of the low risk projects able to succeed increases by (1   )(1   q)(1   e)d
and the proportion of the low risk projects able to fall decreases from the same amount,
according to the value of d.
3.3.2 Syndicates able to improve the performance of the risky projects
This other style of syndication (s2) is dened in an opposite way by a level of homogeneity
h of skills in the syndicate with also h 2 [0;1]. Its variable cost 00cs2(h) is such that
h 6= 0 ) c0
s2(h) > 0, c00
s2(h) > 0, cs2(0) = 0, c0
s2(0) = 0 and limt!1 cs2(h) = +1. Smaller
is 00, greater is the eciency of the syndicate. The improvement of performance of the
projects associated with the homogeneity h of the syndicates is such that the returns of
the low risk (resp. high risk) projects able to succeed is increased to R(1 + h) (resp.
Rj(pj)(1 + h)) where  is a strictly positive constant.
3.4 Sequence of the actions of the leader
The leader uses the following sequences to determine its actions:
(i) At the beginning of the seed period, if it observes a project of class j, it decides to
nance it or not in seed. If she decides to nance it, the leader also determines the level
of screening eort e she applies in seed.
(ii) At the end of the seed period, one part of the bad projects is identied as such
and liquidated.
(iii) At the beginning of development period, if the project has not been identied
as a bad project, it is developed by the leader who chooses a nancial partner (bank or
hedge fund) and - optionally - a syndicates as partner during this stage.5
(iv) At the end of development period, the remaining bad projects are liquidated.
The good projects provide a level of return corresponding to their level of risk and to the
eort of the leader and syndicate, if any.
5Note that the information collected during the seed period does not allow to reconsider the nature
of the association with the nancial partner and - optionally - the syndicate chosen by the leader in seed
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03.5 The choice of the leader
At the beginning of seed period, when a leader faces a given project, it compares (i)
the reservation possibility and the 6 possible forms of development, i.e. (ii) developing
the project with a bank and without syndication, or (iii) with a bank with a syndicate
able to reduce the number of failures, or (iv) with a bank and a with a syndicate able
to improve the performance of the risky projects, or (v) with a hedge fund and without
syndication, or (vi) with a hedge fund and with a syndicate able to reduce the number
of failures, or (vii) with a hedge fund and a syndicate able to improve the performance
of the risky projects.
The values of the prots are given in each case in the following ways:
(i) The reservation prot is conventionally dened as (1):

res = 0 (1)
(ii) The prot corresponding to a development phase with a bank and without syndi-
cation is the solution to the following optimization problem:
bank
ws = max
e2[0;1]
[pjRj(pj) + (1   )qR] + [pj + (1   )q]P
 [S + c(e)]   rD[1   (1   pj)e   (1   )(1   q)e]
 D[(1   pj) + (1   )(1   q)](1   e)
(2)
(iii) The prot corresponding to a development phase with a bank and with a syndicate
able to reduce the number of failures is given by:
bank
s1 = max
e2[0;1];d2[0;1]
[pjRj(pj) + (1   )(q + (1   q)(1   e)d)R]
+[pj + (1   )(q + (1   q)(1   e)d)]P   [S + c(e)]
 rD[1   (1   pj)e   (1   )(1   q)e]
 D[(1   pj) + (1   )(1   q)(1   d)](1   e)   C   0cs1(d)
(3)
(iv) The prot corresponding to a development phase with a bank and a syndicate
able to improve the performance of the risky projects is given by:
bank
s2 = max
e2[0;1];h2[0;1]
[pRj(pj) + (1   )(q)R](1 + h)
+[pj + (1   )q]P   [S + c(e)]
 rD[1   (1   pj)e   (1   )(1   q)e]
 D[(1   pj) + (1   )(1   q)](1   e)   C   00cs2(h)
(4)
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syndication is the solution to the following optimization problem:
hf
ws = max
e2[0;1]
(1   )[pjRj(pj) + (1   )qR]   [S + c(e)]
 (1   )D[(1   pj) + (1   )(1   q)](1   e)
(5)
(vi) The prot corresponding to a development phase with a hedge fund and a syndi-
cate able to reduce the number of failures is given by:

hf
s1 = max
e2[0;1];d2[0;1]
(1   )[pjRj(p) + (1   )(q + (1   q)(1   e)d)R]
 [S + c(e)]
 (1   )D[(1   pj) + (1   )(1   q)(1   d)](1   e)
 C   0cs1(d)
(6)
(vii) The prot corresponding to a development phase with a hedge fund and a syn-
dicate able to improve the performance of the risky projects is given by:

hf
s2 = max
e2[0;1];h2[0;1]
(1   )[pjRj(pj) + (1   )qR](1 + h)   [S + c(e)]
 (1   )D[(1   pj) + (1   )(1   q)](1   e)
 C   00cs2(h)
(7)
4 The results
We consider in a rst sub-section the determinants of the successful matchings between
leaders and syndicates. A rst set of questions refers to the following Given that leaders
are heterogeneous in their ability to screen the available projects during the early stage,
does this heterogeneity has some consequence on their choices to associate a syndicate
during the development stage, and with which kind of syndicate? We then introduce
the role of the nancial partners. In this form of association integrating three partners
(a leader, a syndicate and a nancial partner), which are the ecient teams? This will
be the issue of the second sub-section. The last one will be devoted to the inuence of
relevant parameters, measuring for instance the level of risk or the shape of the projects.
4.1 Skills and syndicates eciency
An immediate concern is with the direct and cross eects of the leader and syndicates
expertise on the screening eort of leader in seed and on the level of activation of each
kind of syndicate. A joint concern is with the consequence of the comparative eciency
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0of the leader and syndicates on the type of funding solution at the development stage
selected by the leaders in charge of the projects.
Venture Capitalists are dierentiated in expertise and experience. This dierentiation
is particularly relevant in seed. At this stage, the leader has to estimate the technological
content of the projects and of their potentiality to nd a market. It must also appreciate
the quality of the managing team in charge of the project. Its ability in these two tasks is
a condition of its eciency to screen the project and to eliminate an adequate number of
the \bad" project before the development stage. We then begin to analyze the inuence
of the eciency of the leader in seed on the development technology that it could promote.
We rst consider, within each technology, the eect of an improvement of the eciency
in seed of the leader on the intensity of eort in seed of the leader. We obtain the following
results:
Lemma 1. All things equal, an increase in the eciency of the screening eorts of leaders
in seed has locally:
(i) a positive eect on its optimal level of eort in seed and on its prot when the optimal
technology involves no syndicate or syndicates able to improve the performance of the
risky projects. In this last case, it has no eect on the level of activation of the syndicate.
(ii) a non-negative eect on its optimal level of eort in seed and on its prot when
the optimal technology involves a syndicate able to reduce the number of failures. It has
simultaneously a non-positive eect on the level of activation of the syndicate.
Proof : see Appendix 1.
The eects of a change in the eciency of the screening eort in seed within each
possible technology are then dierent according to the type of syndicate used during the
development phase. Without any syndicate, the result is trivial: the screening eort of
the leader is in this case the only way to improve the global return of the projects. When
the development technology includes the second form of syndicate, the syndicate and the
leader add - somewhere independently - their eorts to increase the expected return of
the projects. The leader has the objective to exclude in seed the bad projects in order to
improve the expected return of the remaining ones during the development phase. The
role of the second type of syndicate is then to increase the return of the good projects.
Greater is the proportion of these projects during the development phase, larger is the
expected return. When the syndicate is of the rst type, the expertise of the screening
eorts of the leader in seed and of the rst type of syndicate are partly substitutes,
partly complements. When the costs are neglected, the substitution eects dominate:
the screening eort has the eect to eliminate the bad projects and the eort of the rst
type of syndicates restore them some minimal return: they are substituable tasks. But
when the leader or the syndicate are excessively activated and when we re-integrate the
inuence of the costs, it is very expensive to increase each level of activation beyond
acceptable levels: the eect of costs in then to develop complementarities between the
screening eort of the leader of the project and the eort of the syndicate able to reduce
the number of failures to improve the quality of the bad projects. The following lemma
completes the analysis of the interactions between the interventions of the VC in charge
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0of the project and those of the syndicates.
Lemma 2. All things equal,
(i) an increase in the eciency of the eorts of the syndicate able to reduce the number
of failures during the development stage has locally a non-positive eect on the optimal
level of the screening eort in seed of the leader and a non-negative eect on its prot
(ii) an increase in the eciency of the eorts of syndicates able to improve the per-
formance of the risky projects during the development stage has locally no eect on the
optimal level of the screening eort in seed of the VC in charge of the project and a
positive eect on its prot.
Proof : see Appendix 2.
This lemma conrms our rst remarks. When a syndicate oers the possibility to
re-qualify the bad projects in acceptable ones, all increase of eciency of this kind of
syndicate tends to lessen the utility of the screening eort in seed. Only one part of
the eect of an increased level of activation of the syndicate is then converted in the
increment of prot: the other is partly absorbed by a cut of the screening eort in seed
of the leader. By contrast, when a syndicate oers the possibility to increase the return
of the risky projects, its activation involves no decrease of the screening eort in seed of
the leader: the increase of activation of the syndicate is in this case fully converted in an
increase of the prot of the leader.
We then derive Proposition 1 which synthesizes the content of Lemmas 1 and 2:
Proposition 1. All things equal,
(i) When the leader has relatively few capacities to select the good projects in seed, she
tends to associate syndicates able to convert during the development stage one part of the
bad projects in acceptable ones. This tendency increases with the eciency of this type
of syndicates.
(ii) When the leader is relatively expert in the selection of good projects in seed, she
tends to associate syndicates able to increase the return of the good projects during the
development stage. This tendency increases with the eciency of this second kind of
syndicates.
Proof : see Appendix 3.
When a leader has few expertise in screening the projects during the seed stage, it
is not always a bad quality leader. Suppose that the costs C are dierentiated among
leaders. This dierentiation could capture for instance the heterogeneous capacity of
leaders to nd partners, to associate diverse skills and competences or to coordinate the
initiatives of the syndicate with its own directives. Consider for instance the case where
the costs C are negatively correlated with the parameters  related to the \direct" e-
ciency of the leader. The association of a given leader with a syndicate of the rst style
- able to increase the return of the good projects - could then be very ecient with large
values of  and small values of C. This choice exploit possible synergies between the
leader and the partners. The other option is also open. With a large C and a small ,
the leader chooses a technology able to add skills without advanced considerations on the
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0interactions of the leader and syndicate partners. Of course, the other option is also open
(C and  are positively correlated): this case would associate expert leaders in seed and
a form of syndicates improving the return of the projects during the development stage.
This rst proposition tends to associate each kind of syndicate to dierent level of
expertise of the leader. One must however interpret it cautiously. Consider for instance
the (rather unrealistic case ...) where the banks backing the investment expenses during
the development phase are highly sensitive to the number of projects nally introduced
to the market while the hedge-funds take all the risk (and then all the prot in case of
success ...). In this case, there is no incentive for the leader to match with a hedge fund.
Moreover, given the characteristics of the leaders associated with banks, the association
of this kind of team with syndicates able to reduce the number of failures is clearly the
best solution, whatever the level of expertise of the leader in seed. The following sub-
section investigates this kind of inuence of the nancial partner during the development
phase and generalizes the analysis of the eect of the nancial partnership on the choice
of development technology by the leader.
4.2 The eect of the incentives from the nancial partners
The nancial partners - banks as hedge-funds - can no longer be considered as passive in-
stitutions, without any action to control the choices of the Venture Capitalists in charge
of the projects. A rst motivation is for them to maintain a competitive advantage
over the other banks when they are banks or over the other hedge-funds when they are
hedge-funds. We neglect in the following lines this rst objective: the actions that it
motivates can be considered as direct consequences of the usual inter-bank competition
/ cooperation issues. A second goal of the nancial partners is to maintain or develop
a competitive advantage over the members of the other category of intermediaries. This
second objective is more or less mitigated by the global strategy of large nancial groups
which control both banking divisions and other nancial departments or subsidiaries. The
last objective of the nancial partners is then to orient the choices of the V.C. in terms
of syndication in the direction they need and to control the levels of eort of leaders and
syndicates. We concentrate on the denition of the kind of actions having mainly this last
goal, keeping also in mind the issues related to the competition between intermediaries .
4.2.1 The nature of the incentives
Banks are interested in creating long term partnerships with the companies and managers
that they fund. This motivation appears in their prot function. We use the symbol
x to represent the actual value of the future expected advantages they expect from a
project successfully nanced during the development stage. r(P) gures the amount of
interest that they receive from the Venture Capitalist in charge of the project. Given the
results of the programs (3) and (4), this amount depends on the parameters of the model
(D;;pj;q;R) but also on the level of the action variables e and d (or h) of the VC
and of the syndicates; e and d (or h) depend themselves on the level of the premium
P that banks attribute to the VC when a project survives denitively. The expenses of
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0the banks P0(P) are also such that 0(P) depends on the same variables except D, i.e.
on the control variable P which plays the role of an incentive parameter for the leader.
The actual prot of the banks is then given by:
B
s = max
P0
f[bank
s (P)][(x   P)0(P) + r(P)] (8)
where s = fws;s1;s2g, (P) = D[1 (1 pj)e (1 )(1 q)e], 0(P) = [pj+(1 )q]
when s = fws;s2g, and 0(P) = [pj + (1   )q + (1   q)(1   e)d] when s = s1. The
function f[bank
s (P)] is continuous and increases at a decreasing rate expresses the extent
of the demand of partnerships addressed to the banks as a function of the premium P.
Note that  does not depend directly on P but only indirectly, by the eect of P on e
and d.
Hedge funds are motivated by the net return of their investment D. Their control
variable is the amount of their share in the capital of the Venture Capitalists in charge
of the projects. Their prot can then be expressed in the following way:
H
s = max
2[0;1]
f[hf
s ()][ ()    0()] (9)
where  () = [pjRj(pj) + (1   )q)R] when s = ws,  () = [pjRj(pj) + (1   )(q +
(1   q)(1   e)d)R] when s = s1,  () = [pjRj(pj) + (1   )qR](1 + h) when s = s2,
 0() = D[(1   pj) + (1   )(1   q)](1   e), when s = fws;s2g and  0() = D[(1  
pj) + (1   )(1   q)(1   d)](1   e) when s = s1. The function f[hf
s ()] has the same
properties than f[bank
s (P)]. Note that   depends on  not directly but through the
optimal eort e.
4.2.2 The eect of banks incentives
A rst step of the analysis is to examine the inuence of the level of P and  on the
optimal actions of the leaders and the syndicates and on the protability of the project
for a given Venture Capitalist. This analysis is summarized in the following lemma:
Lemma 3. All things equal, an increase in the level of the nancial incentives of the
banks has the following consequences:
(i) only a direct eect on the prot of the pair leader / bank when the development tech-
nology involves no syndicates or a syndicate able to increase the return of the best projects
(i) both a direct and an indirect eect on the prot of the pair leader / bank when the
development technology involves a syndicate able to reduce the number of failures. In this
case, the indirect eect results from a substitution of the eort of the syndicate to the
eort of the leader in the screening phase.
Proof : see Appendix 4.
The incentive generated by the banks is then only a way to encourage the eort of
the syndicates able to improve the quality of the bad projects. For the other forms of
development technology, the premium becomes a rent for the leader, without creating any
stimulus to improve the eciency of leader and syndicate. This observation introduces
Lemma 4:
16
h
a
l
s
h
s
-
0
0
4
6
6
5
5
2
,
 
v
e
r
s
i
o
n
 
1
 
-
 
2
4
 
M
a
r
 
2
0
1
0Lemma 4. The optimal level of bank incentives is not always positive.
(i) It is strictly positive when banks are associated with syndicates able to reduce the num-
ber of failures
(ii) It is not always strictly positive when banks are associated with other forms of devel-
opment technologies. In this case, the only cause of optimal positive levels of incentives
is the competition between intermediaries.
Proof : see Appendix 5.
Using incentives to encourage indistinctly the eort of the leaders and syndicates is
then not a good solution for the banks. Note however, as underlined by the second part
of Lemma 4, that if banks and hedge funds compete hardly for attracting a few number of
projects, banks can use incentives in a more classical way: the premium that they serve
to the leader is in this case a way to enlarge or maintain their share of market against
the hedge-funds. This motivation could been illustrated in a better way in a dynamical
version of the model.
4.2.3 The eect of hedge-funds incentives
Hedge-funds generate incentives in regulating their share in the capital of the leader.
When a hedge-fund provides the amount of capital D during the development stage and
requires a fraction  of the prots of the project / covers a fraction  of the losses of D,
its incentive is the proportion of the prot or losses (1 ) that remains under the control
and responsibility of the leader. We then prove the following lemma:
Lemma 5. All things equal, an increase in the level of the nancial incentives of the
hedge-funds has always both direct and indirect positive eects on the prot of the leaders
associated with a hedge fund. The indirect eect is associated to:
(i) an increase in the screening eort in seed when there is no syndication during the
development stage.
(ii) an increase in the level of eort in seed of the leader and / or of the level of eort
of the syndicate when the development technology involves a syndicate able to reduce the
number of failures
(iii) an increase in the level of eort in seed of the leaders and of the level of eort of
the syndicate when the development technology involves syndicates able to improve the
performance of the risky projects.
Proof : see Appendix 6.
The incentives generated by the hedge-funds reach their maximal eciency when the
syndicates are able to improve the return of the more protable (and risky) projects.
But more generally, Lemma 5 attests that hedge-funds are in all cases able to generate
ecient incentives on leaders. This result must however be interpreted cautiously. The
rst reason is that it is partly the result of an artefact: as it is generally the case in
the literature and given that other assumptions make the model more complex, we have
supposed leaders risk-neutral. With this assumption, the expected utility of the leaders
is given by their expected return: once they obtain freely the funds able to nance
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0the development stage, any decrease of the share of the funds-providers in their capital
increase their own expected prot, and expected utility. This risk-neutrality assumption
which clearly over advantages at this stage the funding solutions proposed by the hedge
funds can however be challenged. Venture Capitalist are probably less risk averse than
other categories of agents but not able to increase indenitely their level of exposure in
exchange of an increased return. The other reason to interpret cautiously Lemma 5 is
that, independently from this risk-neutrality assumption, the kind of incentives that we
have considered has a cost in term of return for the hedge-funds that are also risk-neutral
agents. Lemma 6 captures the inuence of this cost:
Lemma 6. The optimal level of hedge-funds incentives is always strictly positive.
(i) Without any syndicate, it increases with the eciency of the screening eorts of the
leader in seed
(ii) When there is a syndicate able to reduce the number of failures, it depends in a com-
plex way on the relative eciency of the leader and the syndicate
(iii) When there is a syndicate able to improve the quality of the good (and risky) projects,
it increases with the eciency of the eorts of the leader and of the syndicate.
Proof : see Appendix 7.
4.2.4 The dominant matching development technologies
The incentives of the nancial partners are nally able to encourage specic styles of part-
nerships between leader and syndicates. Proposition 2 exhibit two ecient development
\technology":
Proposition 2. All things equal, the two dominant matching development technologies
are:
(i) leaders poorly ecient in seed associated with syndicate able to reduce the number of
failures and funded by banks
(ii) leaders highly ecient in seed associated with syndicates highly ecient in improving
the return of the good (and risky) projects during the development stage and funded by
hedge-funds.
Proof : Proposition 2 is a direct consequence of Proposition 1 and Lemmas 3 to 6.
Note that other possibilities may exist, but non simultaneously. For instance, if the
banks are very aggressive against hedge-funds in their attempts to attract projects and
leaders, they could fund leaders ecient in seed having chosen to develop their projects
without any syndicate. This solution could be quite as protable than the solution
associating a syndicate and it will save the costs associated to the syndication. Of course,
the \good leaders" will choose this solution only if the level of incentives of the banks is far
more interesting than the level oered by the hedge-funds. In this case, it is excluded that
hedge-funds could in the same time attract simultaneously the leaders poorly ecient in
seed. In an opposite way, the ecient syndicates able to increase the quality of the bad
projects can be attracted by hedge-funds if the level of incentives of this kind of partners
is interesting. In this case, few possibilities remain to oer partnerships to the banks.
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04.3 Level of risk and shape of the projects
Until this sub-section, we have used the \all things equal" clause to analyze the conditions
of a successful matching between leaders, syndicates and nancial partners. Many pa-
rameters can indeed be decisive in the determination of the good matching technologies.
Some of them are not even captured by the model, as the environment of the project or
the climate of the aairs. It is more easy to analyze the inuence of the level of risk of
the projects which is both expressed by the pair fpj;pjRj(pj)g and by the parameter .
Similarly, the inuence of the \shape" of the project, i.e. of the relative need of nancial
capital in seed and in development stages is captured by the ratio D=S or by the level of
D for a given S.
4.3.1 The inuence of the level of risk
The pair fpj;pjRj(pj)g expresses the probability of success and the return in the case of
success of the high return projects. We have supposed that only ecient projects main-
tain, in such a way that pj and pjRj(pj) vary in opposite directions. Since the return
R of the low return project is supposed invariable, smaller is pj and larger is pjRj(pj) ,
greater is the heterogeneity of the projects. Similarly, when pj decreases and pjRj(pj)
increases, the risky projects require leaders able to screen them and syndicates able to
improve the return of the selected ones. The situation is dierent when pj is rather large
and Rj(pj) rather small. This case requires less screening eort and the two forms of
associations depicted by Proposition 2 could provide challenging solutions. The amount
of capital needed in the development stage has also an inuence on the eect of an in-
crease of pjRj(pj) . When D is quite small, the negative inuence of a decrease of the
proportion of good projects resulting from the decrease of pj is largely dominated by the
positive inuence of the increase of pjRj(pj) and the opposite when D is quite large.
More generally, the inuence of pjRj(pj) is described in Table 1. The notation \ dir."
estimates the direct eect of an increase of the return of the project: by direct eect
we intend the eect on the prot if the level of eort of the leader and of the syndicate
remain unchanged. The notation \ ind." refers to the indirect eect, i.e. to the eect
associated with the increase or decrease of the optimal levels of eort of the leader and
syndicate. The columns " total" consolidate the two eects. The notation \+" indi-
cates a positive impact; we use the notation \+= " when the impact ranges from \rather
positive" to \rather negative"...
Table 1 motivates the following comments:
(i) The funding partner has a decisive inuence on the consequence of an increase
of the risk (and the return) on the prot of the hedge fund. All increase of the return
generated by an increased heterogeneity of the projects involves an increase of the screen-
ing eort of the leader. But since, the cost of the eort is increasing, this increase does
not compensate exactly the increase of the risk. The proportion of the developed bad
projects then increases: the consequence can be negative on the total prot when bank
are the nancial partners: these partners then encourage without a sucient eciency
the development of acceptable projects.
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0Table 1: Eect of an increase in pjRj(pj)
Characteristics  dir.  dir. e d h  ind.  total  total
Characteristics (D small) (D large) (D small) (D large)
bank/ws +/- - + / / + +/- -
bank/s1 +/- - + 0 / + +/- -
bank/s2 +/- - + / + + ++/- +/-
hedge-fund/ws + +/- + / / + + +/-
hedge-fund/s1 + +/- + 0 / + + +/-
hedge-fund/s2 + +/- + / + + ++ ++/-
(ii) The eorts of the leader e and of the syndicates able to improve the return of the
risky projects h increase with the return (and the risk) of the risky projects increases.
No similar relation can be founded between the increase of pjRj(pj) and the optimal level
d of the eort of the syndicate able to improve the probability of success of the projects.
The parameter  represents the proportion of high risk / high return projects in the
total number of available projects. When this number is close to 0, it is of few interest to
associate a syndicate able to improve the quality of the good (and risky) projects, even
if the leader is ecient in seed. For this range of values of , the syndicates able to give
an acceptable return to the low risk projects have their maximal eciency. Oppositely,
when  is close to 1, it is necessary to associate ecient leaders and syndicates able to
improve the return of the risky projects. The amount of capital necessary during the
development stage has also its importance. At this stage, a general analysis of the eect
of  is however dicult, since it requires to integrate precisely the indirect eects passing
through the adjustment of the level of incentives from the nancial partners. When banks
can adjust elastically the level of their incentives to the variations of the parameters, a
matching solution between banks and syndicates able to improve the quality of the low
risk projects can rapidly become the best solution as  decreases. The elasticities of P and
 depend however on f[bank
s (P)] and f[hf
s ()] , i.e. on the conditions of the competition
/ cooperation between banks and hedge funds that we have not fully developed in this
setting.
4.3.2 The inuence of the shape of the project
The \shape" of the project is the relative amount of capital needed in seed and in
development. The \cylindric" projects (with quite the same amount of capital to be
funded in seed and in development phase) do not admit the same development technology
than the projects involving large amount of capital during the development stage. Smaller
is the capital in the development stage, lesser is the weight of the nancial costs of the
capital loan for a leader able to undertake a given project. When D=S decreases, a leader
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0tends to prefer a partnership with a bank: in this case, all the prot is for the leader while
the amount of the losses able to be covered by the hedge fund reduces in proportion of
the total amount of the losses of the project. For the hedge funds interested in nancing
Venture Capital projects, the optimal level of incentives then increases with the decreases
of D=S. As hedge funds match more easily with syndicates able to increase the return of
the risky projects than with the syndicates able to give an acceptable return to the low
risk projects, a decrease of D=S increases the interest for leaders to associate syndicates
of this style. When D=S decreases for large values of  (i.e. for a large proportion of high
risk / high return projects), a leader ecient in the screening activity during the early
stage can switch directly from an association with a hedge fund and a syndicate able to
improve the return of the risky projects to the reservation strategy. Otherwise, for small
values of  (with a small proportion of the risky projects) and in the same situation,
the same leader will choose to associate with a bank and a syndicate able to improve
the quality of the low risk projects. In this case, we could observe the counter-intuitive
following result: the screening eort in seed decreases as D=S decreases or S=D increases,
i.e. as the weight of the capital in seed increases relatively to the capital needed in the
development stage. This apparent paradox is a simple consequence of Lemma 2 (i).
5 Comments and conclusions
Venture Capital investments combine skills and nancial risks. They associate dierent
types of venture capitalists in charge of the project (leaders), dierent kinds of syndicates
and two main ways of funding the projects. The capacity of nancial intermediaries to
assume nancial risk has to meet managerial skills able to screen the projects, then to
increase the number and the return of the successful projects among the selected ones.
This paper present a model in which the screening tasks are devoted in seed stage to
the leader. Once this rst screen has been realized, the objective to increase the number
and the quality of the successful projects is partly shared by the members of syndicates
associated with the leader during the development stage. We adopted these assumptions
objective to identify and analyze the ecient ways to associate these heterogeneous pieces
of the VC technology. We have veried that a syndicate able to increase the number of
successful projects is the best complement to a leader whose skill in the screening tasks is
rather low. Symmetrically, an ecient leader and a syndicate able to increase the return
of the project are good companions. Banks and hedge funds have dierent objectives
when they participate to venture capital investment. The incentives that they develop
are devoted to generate actions from the leader and syndicate compatible with these ob-
jectives. We verify that their incentives rationally tend to encourage some association
between leaders and syndicates. The banks have a greater success with the syndicates
able to increase the number of successful projects; the hedge funds prefer the other style
of syndicates. The level of risk and of the shape of the project are also relevant variables
which promote specic associations between partners.
We plan to test the relevance of our conclusions in more complex environments, con-
sidering for instance for the VCs the possibility to learn. Another joint paper could
test our conclusions with appropriate data in an environment where the heterogeneity of
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0leaders, syndicates and fund providers would appear particularly relevant.
References
Bottazzi, L., Da Rin, M. and Hellmann, T. (2004a), \Active Financial Intermediation: Evidence on
the Role of Organizational Specialization and Human Capital", ECGI Working Paper Series in Finance,
Working Paper N. 49/2004, September.
Bottazzi, L., Da Rin, M. and Hellmann, T. (2004b), \The Changing Face of the European Venture
Capital Industry: Facts and Analysis", The Journal of Private Equity, 7(2) Spring, 26-53.
Bottazzi, L., Da Rin, M. and Hellmann, T. (2008), \Who are the active investors?: Evidence from
venture capital", Journal of Financial Economics, 89, 3, 488-512.
Brander, J.A., Amit, R., and Antweiler, W. (2002). \Venture capital syndication: Improved venture
selection versus the value-added hypothesis", Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 11(3),
423-452.
Bruno, A.V. (1986), \A structural analysis of the venture capital industry", The Art and Science of
Entrepreneurship: 109-117.
Bygrave, W.D. (1987), \Syndicated investments by venture capital rms: a networking perspective",
Journal of Business Venturing, 2,139-154.
Casamatta, C. and C. Haritchabalet. (2007), Experience, screening and syndication in venture
capital investments, Journal of Financial Intermediation, 16(3): 368-398.
Cestone, G., Lerner, J. and White, L., (2006). \The design of syndicates in venture capital", Un-
published manuscript. CSEF-University of Salerno.
Chowdry, B. and Nanda, V. (1996), \Stabilization, syndication and pricing of IPOS". Journal of
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 31, 25-42.
Cohen, W. M., and Levinthal D. A., (1990), Absorptive-capacity - a new perspective on learning
and innovation, Administrative Science Quarterly, 35(1): 128-152.
Cumming, D., Fleming, G., and Schwienbacher, A., (2005). "Liquidity risk and venture capital
nance, Financial Management, 34, 77-105.
Cumming, D., (2006), \Adverse selection and capital structure: Evidence from venture capital",
Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice 30, 155-183.
De Clercq, D. and Dimov, D. (2003), \A knowledge-based view of venture capital rms portfolio
investment specialization and syndication", Frontiers of Entrepreneurship Research, 2003 III, Babson
College.
De Clercq, D., Goulet, P., Kumpulainen M. and M akel a M. (2001), \Portfolio investment strategies
in the Finnish venture capital industry; A longitudinal study". Venture Capital, vol. 3(1), 41-62.
Dimov, D., and Milanov, H., (2010). The interplay of need and opportunity in venture capital
investment syndication, Journal of Business Venturing, Forthcoming.
Fried V.H. and Hisrish, R.D. (1995), \The venture capitalist: a relationship investor", California
Management Review, 37, 101-113.
Fritsch, M., Schilder, D., (2006), \Is venture capital a regional business? The role of syndication".
Freiberg Working Papers, 09/2006, Technical University Bergakademie Freiberg.
Goel R.K. and Hassan, I. (2004), \Fundraising new ventures: some strategies for raising early -
nance", Applied Financial Economics, 14(11), 773-778.
Gupta, A. and Sapienza, H. (1992). \Determinants of venture capital rms: Preferences regarding
the industry diversity and geographic scope of their investments", Journal of Business Venturing, vol.
7(5), 347-362.
Gompers, P. and Lerner, J. (2000), \The determinants of corporate venture capital success: Organiza-
tional structure, incentives, and complementarities", in Randall Morck, editor, Concentrated Ownership,
University of Chicago Press for the National Bureau of Economic Research, 17-50.
Gompers, P., and Lerner, J. (2001), \The Venture Capital Revolution", Journal of Economic Per-
spectives, 15(2), 145-168.
Gompers, P. and Lerner, J. (2004), The Venture Capital Cycle, 2nd edition, The MIT Press: Cam-
bridge, MA.MIT Press.
22
h
a
l
s
h
s
-
0
0
4
6
6
5
5
2
,
 
v
e
r
s
i
o
n
 
1
 
-
 
2
4
 
M
a
r
 
2
0
1
0Gorman, M. and Sahlman, W. A. (1989), \What do venture capitalists do?", Journal of Business
Venturing, 4: 231-248.
Hege, U., Palomino F. and Schwienbacher A. (2003). \Determinants of venture capital performance:
Europe and the United States", Working Paper No. 001. RICAFE - Risk Capital and the Financing of
European Innovative Firms.
Hellman, T. (2002), \A theory of strategic venture investing", Journal of Financial Economics, Vol.
64 (2), 285-314.
Hellman, T. and Puri, M. (2002). \Venture capital and the professionalization of start-up rms:
Empirical evidence", Journal of Finance, vol. 57(1), 169-197.
Hellman, T., Lindsey, L. and Puri, M. (2004). \Building relationships early: Banks in venture
capital", NBER Working Paper No. W10535. National Bureau of Economic Research.
Hsu, D. (2004). \What do entrepreneurs pay for venture capital aliation?", Journal of Finance,
vol. 59(4), 1805-1844.
Lerner, J. (1994), \The syndication of venture capital investments", Financial Management, Vol.
23(3), 16-27.
Lerner, J., (1995), Venture Capitalists and the Oversight of Private Firms, Journal of Finance, 50,
301-318.
Lerner, J. and Schoar, A. (2004), \The illiquidity puzzle: Theory and evidence from private equity",
Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 72(1), 3-40.
Lindsey, L. (2003), \Venture capital keiretsu eect: An empirical analysis of strategic alliances among
portfolio rms", SIERP Discussion Paper No. 02-17. Stanford University.
Lockett, A. and Wright, M. (1999), \The syndication of private equity: Evidence from the UK",
Venture Capital: An International Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance, Vol. 1(4), 303 - 324.
Lockett, A. and Wright, M. (2001), \The syndication of venture capital investments", OMEGA: The
International Journal of Management Science, 29, 375-390.
Macmillan, I.C., Kulow, D.M., and Khoylian, R., (1989), \Venture Capitalists Involvement in Their
Investments - Extent and Performance", Journal of Business Venturing, 4, 27-47.
Manigart, S. (1994). \The founding rate of venture capital rms in three European countries (1970-
1990)", Journal of Business Venturing, Vol. 9(6), 525-541.
Manigart S., Lockett, A., Meuleman, M., Wright M, Landstr om H., Bruining H., Desbri eres P. and
Hommel U. (2006), \Venture capitalists decision to syndicate", Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice.
Vol. 30, no. 2, 131-153.
Mayer, C., Schoors, K. and Yafeh, Y. (2005), \Sources of Funds and Investment Strategies of Venture
Capital Funds: Evidence from Germany, Israel, Japan and the UK", Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol.
11, 586-608.
Meuleman, M., Wright, M., Manigart, S. and Lockett, A. (2009), "Private equity syndication: Agency
costs, reputation and collaboration". Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, Vol. 36 Issue 5/6,
p616-644
Robbie, K., Wright, M. and Chiplin, B. (1997), \The Monitoring of Venture Capital Firms", En-
trepreneurship: Theory and Practice, Vol.21 (4), pp.9-28.
Ruhnka, J. C. et Young, J. E. (1991), \Some Hypotheses About Risk In Venture Capital Investing",
Journal Of Business Venturing , Vol.6, p.115-133.
Sahlman, W. (1990), \The structure and governance of venture capital organizations", Journal of
Financial Economics, Vol. 27(2), p. 473-521.
Sapienza, H. J. (1992). When do venture capitalists add value? Journal of Business Venturing, 7:
9-27.
Sapienza, H.J., Manigart, S., Vermier, W., (1996). "Venture capitalist governance and value added
in four countries", Journal of Business Venturing, 11, 439-469
Schertler, A. (2005), \European venture capital markets: fund providers and invesment characteris-
tics", Applied Financial Economics, 15, Vol. 6, p. 367-380.
Sepp a, T. and J a askel ainen M. (2002), \How the rich become richer in venture capital: Firm per-
formance and position in syndication network", Frontiers of Entrepreneurship Research, 2002(XIII),
Babson College.
Sorenson, O. and Stuart, T. (2001), \Syndication networks and the spatial distribution of venture
capital investments", American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 106(6), p. 1546-1588.
23
h
a
l
s
h
s
-
0
0
4
6
6
5
5
2
,
 
v
e
r
s
i
o
n
 
1
 
-
 
2
4
 
M
a
r
 
2
0
1
0Stuart, T.E., Hoang, H. and Hybels, R.C. (1999), \Interorganizational endorsements and the perfor-
mance of entrepreneurial ventures", Administrative Science Quarterly, 44, 315-349.
Tykvova, T. (2006), \How Do Investment Patterns of Independent and Captive Private Equity Funds
Dier? Evidence from Germany", Financial Markets and Portfolio Management, 20(4), 399-418.
Tykvova, T. (2007), \What do economist tell us about venture capital contracts? ", Journal of
Economic Surveys, Vol.21, No 1, 65-89.
Van Osnabrugge, M. and Robinson, R.J. (2001), \The inuence of a venture capitalist's source of
funds", Venture Capital: An International Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance, 2001, Vol. 1, No 1, 25-39.
Wilson, R. (1968), \The Theory of Syndicates", Econometrica, Vol. 36, No. 1, 119-132.
Woolfman, G. ed. (1993), \A summary of the current investment preferences of the UK venture
capital industry, taken from the 1993 UK Venture Capital Database", London: Levy Gee.
Wright, M. and Robbie, K. (1998), \Venture capital and private equity: A review and synthesis",
Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, Vol. 25(5-6), 521-569.
Wright, M. and Lockett, A. (2003), The structure and management of alliances: Syndication in the
venture capital industry", Journal of Management Studies, 40, 2073-2102
Appendix
Appendix 1: Proof of Lemma 1
We simplify the notation as following: A = [pjRj(pj) + (1   )qR], B = pj + (1   )q, E =
[(1 pj)+(1 )(1 q)] and F = (1 )(1 q). The rst order conditions associated with the maxi-
mization of the expression (2) determine an optimal level of eort e such that c0(e) = (rE + F)D=.
Smaller is , i.e. greater the eciency of the screening eort of the VC in charge of the project, greater
are c0(e), c(e) and nally e. Given that all things equal, c(e) does not depend on , bank
ws is then an
increasing function of e, i.e. a decreasing function of . Similarly, one can easily verify that, all things
equal, e and the prot of the VC in charge of the project are in expressions (4), (5) and (7) decreasing
functions of , i.e. increasing functions of the productivity of the screening eort of the leader in seed.
last, given the independence of the rst order conditions associated to expressions (4) and (7), we note
that the changes no not aect the optimal level of eort of snd 2 when it is involve in the development
strategy. The analysis of the expressions (3) and (6) is slightly more complex. The rst order conditions
associated with the maximization of (3) are (A1) c0(e) = (rE +F)D  d(1 )(1 q)(R+P +D) and
(A2) 0c0
s1(d) = (1   )(1   q)(R + P + D)   e(1   )(1   q)(R + P + D). Given the properties of c0(e)
and c0
s1(d), the system can have no root, one single root or more in fe;dg on the simplex f[0;1][0;1]g.
When there is no root, there is a corner solution in e = 0. A corner solution in d = 0 is indeed excluded
since this case would suppose that (1   )(1   q)(1   e)(R + P + D)  0, which would contradict the
assumptions on c(e) (Note that this result does not imply that the technology \leader/bank/s1" always
dominate the technology \leader/bank/ws" since the xed costs C can still prevent the implementation
of a syndicate, when it is not very ecient). The occurrence of a corner solution in e = 0 is condi-
tioned by the sense of the inequality between (1   )(1   q)(R + P + D)^ d and rE + F where ^ d solves
0c0
s1(d) = (1 )(1 q)(R+P +D). When the rst term is the greatest, i.e. when the nancial expenses
during the development stage are not so important when compared to the eciency of the syndicate,
such a corner solution in e = 0 can exist. In this case, it could be interesting for the leader to limit
itself to fund the seed stage, before using the syndicate able to reduce the number of failures during
the development stage. In the other case, there is at least one local maximum among the roots of the
system (A1)-(A2). The second order conditions and especially - since the other are always satised -
the condition on the determinant of the Hessian of (3), precise the form of the roots (this condition is
c00(e)c00
s1  (1   )2(1   q)2(R + P + D)2). The cases with one and two local maxima are represented
in Figure (1) (Figures 1a and 1b). When there is no single local maximum, the global maximum is one
of the local ones. We verify graphically that when  decreases, i.e. when the eciency of the screening
eorts in seed increase, the optimal level of e increases and the optimal level of d decreases at each local
maxima, then a the global one. The result extends to more than 3 roots for the system (A1)-(A2) on the
simplex f[0;1][0;1]g and to more than 2 local maxima. When the maximum of (1) is a corner solution
f0; ^ dg and given the properties of c(e), a decrease of  has no eect on e and d for small variations of
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0. We conclude that in all cases, a decrease of  does not decrease e and does not increase d. When
the optimum is a corner solution, the prot remains unaected by a decrease in ; in the other cases, it
increases when  decreases. In a similar way, we verify that the optimal level of eort e and the prot of
the VC do not decrease when the productivity of the screening eort in seed increases in expression (6) 
Figure 1a: One single
interior maximum
 
e 
d  1 
1 
Figure 1b: Two interior
local maxima
 
e 
d  1 
1 
Figure 1c: A corner
solution in e = 0
 
e 
d  1 
1 
Figure 1: The eect of a decrease of  on bank
s1
Appendix 2: Proof of Lemma 2
As analyzed in appendix 1, expression (3) - representative of the association \leader/bank/syndicate
able to reduce the number of failures" - provides the rst order conditions (A1) and (A2). 0 only ap-
pears in (A2). All decrease of 0 corresponds to an improvement of the eciency of s1 and moves the
representative curve of (A2) as represented by Figure (2). When there is a single interior solution, the
eect of a decrease of 0 is a decrease of e and an increase of d as shown in Figure 2a. When there are
more that one local maximum, the result is the same for each local maximum as illustrated by Figure
2b. When the initial situation is a corner solution, a decrease of  conrms the corner nature of the
optimum (Figure 2c). In this case, both the optimal level of eort of the syndicates able to reduce the
number of failures and the prot increase while there is denitively no screening eort from the leader in
seed. The analysis of expression (3) - representative of the association leader/hedge fund/s1 - provides
the same kind of observations and eects of a decrease of 0. The the second part of the lemma is easily
veried by considering the rst order conditions of (4) and (7) 
Figure 2a: One single
interior maximum
 
e 
d  1 
1 
Figure 2b: Two interior
local maxima
 
e 
d  1 
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Figure 2c: A corner
solution in e = 0
 
e 
d  1 
1 
Figure 2: The eect of a decrease of 0 on bank
s1
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0Appendix 3: Proof of Proposition 1
According to Lemma 1, when the development technologies \leader/bank/s1" or \leader/hedge fund/s1"
are activated, an increase of  generally involves a partial substitution of the eort of the syndicate in
development to the eort of the leader in seed. This substitution tends to compensate partially the
decrease of prot involved by an increase of . According to Lemma 2, smaller is 0, i.e. higher is the
eciency of the syndicate, smaller is the loss associated with a decrease of the eciency if the VC eort in
seed. When the development technologies \leader/bank/ws", \leader/hedge fund/ws", \leader/bank/s2"
or \leader/hedge fund/s2" are activated, there is a no compensation to the negative eect on prots of
an increase of , which makes these technologies few adapted to large values of . Conversely, when 
decreases, the eect on the prot of \leader/bank/s2" and \leader/hedge fund/s2" is to not partially
withdrawn by a decrease of the eort of the syndicate. The limit cases attained when  is close to 0. In
this case, the negative terms in (4), (7) limit progressively to C + cs2(h) while the positive ones become
as large as small is 00 , i.e. as great is the eciency of the syndicate 
Appendix 4: Proof of Lemma 3
It is easily deduced from expressions (2) and (4), that an increase of P has a (positive) direct inuence
on the optimal value of bank
ws and bank
s2 but no inuence on the optima level of eort e of the leader.
The direct eect of P on bank
s2 is obviously positive. The indirect eect, resulting from a reallocation
of the levels of eort, is less easily deduced from (3). From the 3 possible cases analyzed in Lemma 1,
we however deduce - as illustrated in Figure (3) -, that when P increases, the optimal eort d increases
while the optimal eort e decreases or remains minimal 
Figure 3a: One single
interior maximum
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Figure 3b: Two interior
local maxima
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Figure 3c: A corner
solution in e = 0
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Figure 3: The eect of an increase of  on e and d with development technology
associating banks to s1
Appendix 5: Proof of Lemma 4
Consider for s = s1 the second term of expression (8) which represents the prot of the bank when it
is associated with a project integrating syndicates able to reduce the number of failures. All terms of
the expression are continuous on P, once considered the expressions of e and d. When P vanishes,
this second term G = [(x   P)0(P) + r(P)] is equal to x[p + (1   )q + (1   q)(1   e)d] + rD[1  
(1   p)e   (1   )(1   q)e] When P increases over x, x   P becomes negative and when P increases
slightly more, the negative value of x   P cannot be compensated by the positive value of r(P) which
has rD as upper bound. G has then a maximum for P  0. To verify that this maximum is strictly
positive, consider the value of the derivative of G with respect to P when P = 0. This expression is
x(1 q)[(@d=@P)(1 e) (@e=@P)d)] [p+(1 )(q +(1 q)(1 e)d)] rD[(p)+(1 )(1 
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0q)](@e=@P) where the values of @e=@P and @d=@P are expressed for P = 0. Given Lemma 3, the
rst and the third term are positive. The second is negative but smaller than 1, then negligible when x
and/or rD have reasonable values. Given the sign of the derivative of f[bank
s (P)] on P, the conclusion
is maintained when we re-integrate the inuence of this rst term of expression (8). This proves the rst
part of the Lemma. Consider now the same expression (8) when s = ws or s = s2. It is easy to verify
that, given Lemma 3, G decreases when P increases. The value of G is also positive for P = 0. The sense
of variation of expression (8) then depends only on the respective weights of the increase of f[bank
s (P)]
and of the decrease of G. Given our assumptions on f[bank
s (P)], the maximum is then obtained for a
positive value of P if for small values of P the quantity of the attracted projects compensate the reduced
return of each ones. It is nil in the other cases. This proves the second part of the Lemma 
Appendix 6: Proof of Lemma 5
An increase of the level of incentives from the hedge-fund corresponds to a decrease of . As a con-
sequence of this, both the prot dened by (5) and the level of eort of the leader e increase when
there is no syndicate. The analysis of expression (5) is less immediate. As when a pair leader/bank is
associated to a syndicate able to reduce the number of failures, there is in this case a possibility of corner
solution fe = 0;dg. In other cases the solution is interior, as a solution of the rst order conditions
c0(e) = (1 )DE  (1 )F(D +R)d and 0c0
s1 = (1 )(D +R) (1 )(D +R)e of expression (6).
A decrease of  shifts the curves corresponding to these equations. The slopes of the curves determine
the position of the new intersection. In all cases, the new intersection involves an increase of e and/or
d. The analysis of (7) is easier. It proves, without diculty that e and/or h increase(s) when the
level of incentives increases 
Appendix 7: Proof of Lemma 6
Whatever s, consider the second term H = [ ()    0()] of the expression (9) which represents the
prot of the hedge-fund for a given pair \leader/hedge fund" not associated with a syndicate. It is easy
to verify that for  = 1, no leader will be able to accept the partnership while for  = 0, the prot of the
hedge-fund given by expression (9) vanishes. Note also that all the terms of (9) are continuous on  for all
specications of s. Note at last that, given that the costs S +c(e) are supported by the leader and not
by the hedge-fund, a protable project for the leader is always also a protable project for the hedge-fund
when  < 1. From Lemma 5, we then deduce that an optimal level of incentive  such that 0 <  < 1
always exists from the hedge-fund side when the only objective is to maximize the expected prot of a
single project. Given the properties of f[hf
s ()], the existence of an interior optimal level of incentives
is conrmed when the rst term of expression (9) is taken into consideration. The proof of the indent (i)
is obtained by deriving H relatively to  with the specications of   and  0 corresponding to s = ws. In
this case, only  0 depends indirectly on () by the variations of e. From Lemma 5, e increases when 
decreases, i.e. when the level of incentives increases. This increase of e reduces the losses on capital of
the hedge-fund, then increases the optimal level of incentives. When the eciency of the screening eort
increases ( decreases), e increases more rapidly when  decreases: the optimal level of incentives is then
obtained with a smaller value of . The indent (ii) is the result of the lack of any simple analysis of the
eect on the optimal value of  of the eciency of the eorts of the leader and of the syndicate when this
last tends to improve the quality of the bad projects. Note for instance that the eect of an improvement
of the eciency of the screening eort of the leader is then ambiguous: this improvement decreases the
losses but also the prot of the hedge-fund. The eect of an improvement of the eorts of the syndicate
is less ambiguously positive for the partners. When both the eciencies increase, the resulting eect is
however uncertain and the it is the same for the eect on . The proof of the indent (iii) reproduces the
proof of the indent (i). The only dierence is that also   depends in this case on  by the variations of h 
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